












This paper analyzes labor market responses to productivity shocks
when ﬁrms set employment criteria on the basis of the likelihood of
hiring high or low productivity workers. In response to a positive pro-
ductivity shock, ﬁrms do not raise the criterion as much as the shock,
increasing the proportion of low productivity workers among the em-
ployed. The observed average productivity may respond negligibly
even if employment changes substantially. Interest rate ﬂuctuations
can yield an opposite relation between productivity and employment,
explaining the weak empirical relationship.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper proposes an alternative view of the labor market to explain weak
and contradictory relations between employment and productivity over the
business cycle. Instead of choosing an amount of labor to employ at a par-
ticular real wage, ﬁrms set an employment criterion to determine which ap-
plicants to hire. In contrast to the implications of the standard model with
∗The authors are indebted to Betty Daniel, Michael Jerison and Thad Mirer for helpful
comments. Remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.
1homogeneous labor, the employment criterion approach yields the following
major results.
• In response to a productivity shock, observed average productivity
varies less than proportionately with the initial productivity shock,
so that large employment ﬂuctuations can be associated with small
observed productivity changes.
• Average productivity can be positively or negatively related to employ-
ment, depending on whether the ﬂuctuation in the economy is from a
productivity shock or a monetary disturbance (aﬀecting the interest
rate).
In the Real Business Cycle approach initially developed by Kydland and
Prescott (1982), productivity shocks are the source of aggregate ﬂuctuations
in employment and economic activity (see the review by Hartley, Hoover,
and Salyer, 1998). One question considered in the literature is whether ad-
justments to productivity shocks would generate employment ﬂuctuations of
the magnitudes observed empirically. Hansen (1985) shows that large ﬂuc-
tuations in employment can be generated by the model if labor is assumed
to be indivisible (see also Hansen and Wright, 1992). A related question
is why the posited relation between productivity shocks and aggregate ﬂuc-
tuations is not reﬂected in empirical estimates of the correlation between
productivity and employment (measured in hours worked). Low correlation
between productivity and employment has been explained within the litera-
ture by introducing other sources of shocks. Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright
(1991) introduce household production and home production shocks, and
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) introduce government spending shocks
(see also Hansen and Wright, 1992).
This paper proposes an alternative resolution of these issues. Instead of
choosing an amount of labor, ﬁrms choose an employment criterion. Work-
ers are heterogeneous and have either high productivity or low productiv-
ity. Firms observe worker productivity imperfectly and set an employment
criterion for the observed worker productivity to determine which workers
to employ. In response to a productivity shock that increases worker pro-
ductivities proportionately, ﬁrms raise the employment criterion less than
proportionately to the shock and may even lower it. Employment expands
along with a decrease in the proportion of high productivity workers among
2the employed, which counters the increase in average productivity from the
productivity shock. The result can be a substantial increase in employment
associated with a negligible change in observed average productivity. As
a simple, paradigmatic model of the labor market, the analysis developed
here abstracts from dynamics and expectations that are important in fully
delineated macroeconomic models.
Heterogeneous labor has been introduced previously in the study of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations (Kydland, 1984; King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988;
Hansen and Sargent, 1988; Cho and Rogerson, 1988; and Cho, 1995). Prasad
(1996) investigates aggregation bias in measurements of productivity and the
real wage from ignoring skill heterogeneity in workers. Employment criteria
or hiring standards have been considered in labor economics as an alterna-
tive margin of adjustment over the business cycle. Gaston (1972) shows that
hiring standards vary depending on labor market conditions. Thurow (1975)
develops the concept of an employment criterion in developing a theory of
job competition to explain statistical discrimination (see also Schlicht, 1981).
Lockwood (1991) analyzes a matching model in which ﬁrms observe worker
productivity imperfectly and use unemployment duration as an employment
criterion. Schlicht (2002) develops a model in which ﬁrms simultaneously set
wage oﬀers and hiring standards, generating results that diﬀer from eﬃciency
wage models.
Section 2 develops the model, beginning with ﬁrm behavior. While the
proportion of unemployed workers is exogenous to the individual ﬁrm, it is
endogenously determined in the market. Incorporating the determination of
this proportion into the ﬁrm ﬁrst order condition yields a market condition
for equilibrium, permitting comparative statics. Section 3 introduces pro-
ductivity shocks, which change worker productivities proportionately with-
out changing ﬁrm abilities to distinguish between high and low productivity
workers. It is shown that the employment criterion increases less than pro-
portionately to a productivity shock, and that average productivity increases
by a smaller proportion than the productivity shock. Section 4 considers
ﬂuctuations in the interest or discount rate as a source of shock to the labor
market, presumably generated by monetary disturbances. Since the beneﬁts
of employing workers are distributed over time, a change in the discount rate
leads ﬁrms to alter their employment criteria. It is shown that an interest
rate increase reduces employment while raising average productivity, since
the employment criterion becomes stricter. This is the opposite relationship
from a productivity shock. Section 5 discusses the conclusions.
32M o d e l
2.1 Firm Determination of Employment Criterion
The labor market is characterized as follows. Identical ﬁrms interview work-
ers and decide on the basis of a test or interview whether a worker is likely to
have high or low productivity. Firms decide to hire a worker if the expected
proﬁt from the worker is positive (or non-zero). It will be shown that ﬁrms set
an employment criterion and hire any worker with a test score greater than
or equal to that employment criterion. Workers have a common quit rate
but diﬀerent hiring rates depending on whether they have high or low pro-
ductivity. The two types of workers then have unequal unemployment rates,
which determine endogenously the proportion of high productivity workers
among the unemployed. This section shows how the employment criterion is
determined and examines its existence and uniqueness.
First consider the problem facing the ﬁrm. Suppose workers either have
high productivity, p1, or low productivity, p2,w i t hp1 >p 2. Suppose the
ﬁrm observes the productivity imperfectly as in the statistical discrimination
literature:
yi = pi +  i (1)
where pi is the productivity of worker i, yi is the observed productivity for
worker i,a n d i is an independently and identically distributed random error
term. Suppose  i is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ2,a n dl e t
f( ) and F( ) be the probability density function and cumulative distribution
function, respectively.
Let w be the wage rate, taken as given in this section (Section 4.3 will
consider the determination of the wage rate). The wage is the same for all
workers. Let q be the quit rate, the same for all workers, and let r be the
discount rate, the same for all ﬁrms. Suppose ﬁrms incur a cost of c for all
workers hired. By integration, the present discounted value from hiring a




− c,i =1 ,2 (2)
It is assumed that π1 > 0 >π 2. If instead π1 >π 2 > 0, the ﬁrm would hire
all workers, and if 0 >π 1 >π 2, the ﬁrm would hire no workers.
Now consider the likelihood that a worker with observed productivity (or
score) yi has high productivity, p1. If the worker actually has productivity
4p1,t h e n i = yi − p1, while if the worker actually has productivity p2,t h e n
 i = yi − p2. Let µ be the proportion of high productivity workers among
the unemployed. (This will be determined endogenously by ﬁrm hiring de-
cisions, but a single ﬁrm’s decision will not aﬀect µ so the ﬁrm will take µ
as given.) Applying Bayes Rule, the likelihood that a worker with score yi is
high productivity is
µf(yi − p1)
µf(yi − p1)+( 1− µ)f(yi − p2)
(3)
The probability that the worker is low productivity is one minus the amount
in 3. The expected added proﬁt from hiring worker i is then
E(πi)=
µf(yi − p1)π1 +( 1− µ)f(yi − p2)π2
µf(yi − p1)+( 1− µ)f(yi − p2)
(4)
The ﬁrm should hire the worker whenever E(πi) ≥ 0.1
The following argument shows that there will be a threshold value of yi,
the employment criterion y0, such that it will be proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to
hire all workers with yi ≥ y0. A consequence of the normality assumption is
that dlogf( )/d  = −2 /2σ2, a decreasing function of  . Then









so that f(yi − p1)/f(yi − p2) is an increasing function of yi. Let y0 be the
value of yi such that the numerator in 4 is zero:
µf(y0 − p1)π1 +( 1− µ)f(y0 − p2)π2 =0 (6)







1A worker with yi = y0 will yield zero expected proﬁtt ot h eﬁrm. Such workers will
have measure zero. As a convention, it will be assumed that ﬁrms hire them too.
2Existence can be demonstrated as follows using features of the normal distribution.
At low values of y0, f(y0 −mp1)/f(y0 −mp2) will approach zero, so that the left side will
be negative (since π2 < 0 ). As y0 increases indeﬁnitely, the ratio f(y0−mp1)/f(y0−mp2)
will increase indeﬁnitely and the left hand side will be positive since π1 > 0. By continuity,
there will be a value y0 such that the left hand side of the equation is zero.
5so that E(πi) > 0. Therefore the ﬁrm will hire all workers with yi ≥ y0.
The ﬁrm’s strategy concerning which workers to hire is analogous to the
reservation wage property in search theory.
Because of the foregoing result, it is possible to reformulate the ﬁrm’s
problem as follows. Let β be the number of interviews per period for the ﬁrm
(assumed to be exogenous to the ﬁrm) and let CI be the cost per interview.
Then the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁtp e rp e r i o di s :
E(π)=β (µ[1 − F(y0 − p1)]π1 +( 1− µ)[1 − F(y0 − p2)]π2 − CI) (8)
The ﬁrm maximizes E(π) with respect to y0, yielding the ﬁrst order condition
in 6. The second order condition, after applying the ﬁrst order condition and
rearranging, is given by 5 and is satisﬁed because of the normality assump-
tion.
The ﬁrm’s problem in choosing the employment criterion y0 can be under-
stood as follows. Any unemployed worker appearing for an interview could
be either a high productivity or a low productivity worker. The ﬁrm is willing
to risk hiring a low productivity worker (and losing money on that worker)
if there is a suﬃcient chance of getting a high productivity worker and mak-
ing money. If yi = y0, the addition to proﬁts from the chance of hiring the
high productivity worker just balances the loss from the risk of hiring a low
productivity worker, and the expected gain in proﬁt from hiring the worker
is zero. At any higher value of yi, the expected proﬁt from hiring a high
productivity worker outweighs the risk of loss, and the expected added proﬁt
is positive.
2.2 Proportions of the Employed and Unemployed That
Are High Productivity
Firms, in choosing the employment criterion y0, take µ, π1, and π2 as given.
However, µ, the proportion of the unemployed that are high productivity,
depends on the hiring decisions of ﬁrms. This section examines how µ is
determined.
Suppose workers receive interviews at the rate of θ per period. A worker
with productivity pi will have yi <y 0 in a proportion F(y0−pi) of interviews.
Then the proportion of interviews that yield job oﬀers is 1 − F(y0 − pi).
The rate at which an unemployed worker with productivity pi gets a job is
therefore θ[1 − F(y0 − pi)]. Let ui b et h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ef o rw o r k e r s
6with productivity pi. The long run equilibrium level of unemployment will
be achieved when the ﬂow of workers from employment to unemployment,
(1 − ui)q, equals the ﬂow from unemployment to employment:




q + θ[1 − F(y0 − pi)]
,i=1 ,2 (10)
Let ρ be the proportion of high productivity workers among the popula-
tion. The proportion of workers unemployed in equilibrium is ρu1+(1−ρ)u2.
The proportion of unemployed workers that are high productivity is then
µ =
ρu1
ρu1 +( 1− ρ)u2
(11)
2.3 Market Determination of Employment Criterion
The previous derivations can now be combined to yield the following theorem
on the market determination of the employment criterion.
Theorem 1 In the Employment Criterion Model, the criterion y0 exists and
satisﬁes the following condition:
ρ
1 − ρ
q + θ[1 − F(y0 − p2)]







Proof: Using 11 to substitute for µ in the ﬁrm ﬁrst order condition 6
yields
ρu1f(y0 − p1)π1 +( 1− ρ)u2f(y0 − p2)π2
ρu1 +( 1− ρ)u2
=0 (13)
Multiplying by ρu1 +( 1− ρ)u2, substituting for u1 and u2 from 10 and
rearranging yields 12. When this condition is satisﬁed, ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order
conditions are satisﬁed, and µ is consistent with ﬁrm choices of y0. The value
of y0 satisfying 12 is such that the labor market is in equilibrium.
Next, consider existence and uniqueness of the employment criterion sat-
isfying 12. The strategy of the proof can be demonstrated using Figure 1.
The upward-sloping curve in the ﬁgure shows the left hand side of 12 as a
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Figure 1: Market Equilibrium Condition
function of y0.3 The horizontal line is at the ratio of proﬁts −π2/π1, where
π2 is negative. The value of y0 where the curve reaches −π2/π1 is the equi-
librium value. If the left hand side of 12 is monotonically increasing, starting
below −π2/π1 and going above that value, then existence and uniqueness
would follow immediately. While f(y0 − p1)/f(y0 − p2) increases monotoni-




q + θ[1 − F(y0 − p2)]
q + θ[1 − F(y0 − p1)]
(14)
does not. It is therefore necessary to investigate the individual components
of 12 that depend on y0.










= Exp((p1 − p2)(2y0 − p1 − p2)/(2σ
2)) (15)
3The parameters for this ﬁgure are σ =1 ,q= .1,w= .6,r= .05,p 1 =1 ,p 2 = .5,
ρ = .5,c= .75,C I = .2 and µ = .4. The equilibrium value of y0 is .854 and the value of µ
is .412.









Figure 2: Unemployment Rates
where Exp(x)=ex. Since p1 >p 2, this is an increasing exponential function
of y0, starting at zero for indeﬁnitely small y0 and increasing indeﬁnitely as
y0 increases indeﬁnitely.
Now consider u1/u2. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the unemployment
rates individually and Figure 3 shows the ratio u1/u2. From the functional
forms, this ratio ﬁrst decreases over an interval and then increases. Since the
unemployment rates approach each other at arbitrarily low and high values
of y0, the ratio u1/u2 starts at one and ends at one as y0 increases over its
range. Then the left-hand side of 12 starts at zero for suﬃciently low y0 (and
is less than −π2/π1) and eventually goes above −π2/π1 for suﬃciently large
y0. By continuity, the left hand side of 12 must equal −π2/π1 at some value
of y0, establishing existence. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
The theorem does not include a statement of uniqueness because of com-
plications. The ratio f(y0 − p1)/f(y0 − p2) is monotonically increasing but
u1/u2 is not. However, if the solution for y0 yields suﬃciently low unemploy-
ment rates, the slope of u1/u2 approaches zero so that the product of the
two ratios is monotonically increasing in a lower range for y0. Also, it can be
shown that changes in the ratio f(y0 − p1)/f(y0 − p2) dominate changes in
u1/u2, so the left hand side of 12 is a monotonically increasing function of the
employment criterion, y0. The market equilibrium value of the employment
criterion would then be unique.








Figure 3: Ratio of Unemployment Rates, u1/u2
2.4 Comparative Statics
The condition for the equilibrium employment criterion in 12 yields the fol-
lowing comparative statics results:
Theorem 2 The employment criterion y0 will be greater when c, w or θ are
greater or when r, ρ, p1 or p2 are less.
Proof. The equilibrium employment criterion occurs when the left-hand
side of 12 crosses the horizontal line at the level −π2/π1. When the left-hand
side of the condition shifts down or −π2/π1 goes up, the employment criterion
increases. As c or w increase, π1 decreases and π2 decreases, so that (−π2),
a positive amount, increases. Then the ratio −π2/π1 increases, leading to
an increase in y0. Similarly, an increase in the interest rate r raises −π2/π1,
resulting in an increase in y0. Declines in either p1 or p2 raise −π2/π1, leading
to a greater value of y0. The parameters ρ and θ aﬀect the left-hand side of
the condition but not −π2/π1. If ρ declines, the left-hand side shifts down.
If θ increases, the ratio u1/u2 declines since 1−F(y0 −p1) > 1−F(y0 −p2),
shifting the left-hand side of the condition down and increasing y0. This
completes the proof.
In general, parameter changes that raise the proﬁtability of a marginal
applicant (with criterion equal to y0) lead ﬁrms to risk hiring more low pro-
10ductivity workers (by lowering the criterion y0) in order to hire more high
productivity workers. Comparative static eﬀects of parameter changes are
relevant to the analysis of labor market responses to cyclical conditions, which
will be examined in Section 4.
3T h e E ﬀects of Productivity Shocks
3.1 Assumptions
At this point it is possible to introduce productivity shocks into the model.
In the RBC models, positive productivity shocks raise the demand for labor.
Then at a constant wage rate, employment increases along with an increase in
the average productivity of labor. In the model developed here (with hetero-
geneous labor, imperfect observation of worker productivity and employment
criteria), the net response depends on the adjustment in the employment cri-
terion. It will be shown that the employment criterion adjusts less than the
productivity shock, raising the proportion of low productivity workers among
the employed and moderating the observed productivity change. The change
in average productivity may be negligible in comparison to the productivity
shock.
Productivity shocks are assumed to aﬀect all workers’ productivities by
the same proportion. Then in 1, the productivity of a worker of type i is
pis, i =1 ,2 (16)
where s is the productivity shock and p1 and p2 are the productivities of the
high and low productivity workers when s equals one. The standard devia-
tion of the error term in 1 also changes in proportion to the shock, so that
the shock has no eﬀect on the ability of ﬁrms to distinguish between high
and low productivity workers. This assumption is fully consistent with the
type of productivity shock assumed in RBC models. To incorporate this as-
sumption, write the probability density function for the normally distributed
error term in 1 as f( ;σ), where σ is the standard deviation. In response to a
productivity shock s, the probability density function and cumulative distri-
bution function do not change values if   increases by the same proportion as
s. This is achieved if the probability density function and cumulative distri-
bution function are f( ;sσ) and F( ;sσ). Then the assumption concerning
11the productivity shocks yields
f(s ;sσ)=f( ;σ),F(s ;sσ)=F( ;σ) (17)
3.2 Eﬀects of Productivity Shocks on the Employment
Criterion
With productivity shocks given by 16, the test scores in 1 will be raised by a
positive productivity shock. More of both types of workers will have scores
that exceed the existing employment criterion, y0. However, the employment
criterion will also adjust, as described in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 In response to a positive productivity shock s>1 (starting from
s =1 ) , the ratio of the equilibrium employment criterion to the parameter
s declines. Unemployment rates of both types of workers decline but if the
unemployment rates initially are suﬃciently low, the ratio u1/u2 increases,
and the proportion of high productivity workers among the unemployed, µ,
increases.
Proof. The proof proceeds by considering whether an increase in the
employment criterion proportional to s satisﬁes the market condition 12.
Let b y0 be the initial value of the employment criterion. By construction,
f(b y0s − pis;sσ)=f(b y0 − pi;σ) and F(b y0s − pis;sσ)=F(b y0 − pi;σ). Then
the left-hand side of 12 will have the same value at b y0s after the shock that
it had at b y0 before the shock. However, −π2/π1 will be lower. The proﬁt




w + c(q + r) − p2s
p1s − w − c(q + r)
(18)
An increase in s reduces the numerator and raises the denominator, reducing
the ratio on the right side of 12. After the positive productivity shock, the
new equilibrium value of the employment criterion will thus be less than b y0s.
The eﬀect of a productivity shock can be understood using Figure 1. If the
horizontal axis is now y0/s, the curve representing the left-hand side of 12
does not move in response to a productivity shock. Only the horizontal line
at −π2/π1 is aﬀected by s, and it moves down when s goes up. The new
equilibrium market criterion will be less than b y0s. If ys is the equilibrium
employment criterion after the shock, then ys/s < y0 and F(ys/s − pi;σ) <
F(y0 − pi;σ). The eﬀect on the unemployment rates is therefore the same
12as a reduction in the employment criterion, holding the productivity shock
ﬁxed. The unemployment rates from both types of workers decline, and from
Figure 3, when the unemployment rates are suﬃciently low, the reduction
in the employment criterion raises u1/u2. From 11, it follows that µ also
increases. This completes the proof.
3.3 Average Productivity
The most important consequence of Theorem 3 is that the change in the
mix of employed will have opposite eﬀects from the productivity shock itself.
Although productivity shocks will substantially aﬀect the aggregate levels of
employment and unemployment, the observed eﬀect on average productivity
will be substantially moderated. While a positive productivity shock will by
itself raise average productivity, the increase in the proportion of employed
who are low productivity will reduce it. Then substantial ﬂuctuations in
employment could be associated with negligible or undetectable productivity
changes. This section examines the eﬀects of productivity shocks on average
productivity.




ρ(1 − u1)+( 1− ρ)(1 − u2)
(19)
Then average productivity, φ, is
φ = νp1s +( 1− ν)p2s (20)
The average productivity depends both on the productivity shock, s, and on
ν. In turn, ν depends on the ratio of employment rates:
ν =
ρ(1 − u1)/(1 − u2)
ρ(1 − u1)/(1 − u2)+( 1− ρ)
(21)







When 1/u2 is substantially greater than one, the ratio of employment rates
decreases when the ratio of unemployment rates, u1/u2, rises. The relations













Figure 4: Proportions of Workers That Are High Productivity
between the employment criterion y0 and µ and ν are shown in Figure 4,
holding the productivity shock s ﬁxed. As shown, a reduction in the employ-
ment criterion raises the proportion of unemployed that are high productivity
and reduces the proportion of employed that are high productivity, if the un-
employment rates are suﬃciently low.
From Theorem 3, a positive productivity shock reduces y0/s. From 17,
the eﬀect of a productivity shock that reduces y0/s is equivalent to a reduc-
tion in y0, holding s ﬁxed. As a result, ν declines in response to a positive
productivity shock. The net eﬀect on φ in 20 is summarized in the following
theorem:
Theorem 4 In response to a productivity shock s>1 (starting from s =
1), observed average productivity increases less than proportionately to the
productivity shock when unemployment rates are suﬃciently small.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between average productivity and the
productivity shock using the same assumptions as in Figure 1. As shown,
starting at low levels of s, a positive productivity shock reduces average
productivity instead of raising it.










Figure 5: Response of Average Productivity to Shock
4 Comparisons of Labor Market Disturbances
This section demonstrates that the relation between employment and av-
erage productivity depends on the source of disturbances to the economy.
The previous section developed the consequences of productivity shocks in
the employment criterion model, showing that a positive productivity shock
generates an increase in employment (or decrease in unemployment) in com-
bination with an observed average productivity change that is smaller than
the productivity shock. An alternative disturbance to the economy in the
employment criterion model is a ﬂuctuation in the interest or discount rate,
presumably caused by a monetary disturbance. Fluctuations in the inter-
est rate will be shown to generate a negative relation between average pro-
ductivity and employment, just the opposite of the relation generated by
productivity shocks.
Eﬀects of interest rate ﬂuctuations are simpler to analyze than produc-
tivity shocks. A change in the interest rate has no eﬀects on the left-hand
side of the market equilibrium condition in 12. From 18, an increase in the
interest rate raises the ratio −π2/π1. In Figure 1, the upward sloping line
stays ﬁxed while the horizontal line at the level −π2/π1 goes up, so that the
market equilibrium employment criterion is higher. The higher employment
15criterion then raises the unemployment rates of both types of workers and,
if the unemployment rates are suﬃc i e n t l yl o w ,l o w e r st h er a t i ou1/u2, lowers
the proportion of high productivity workers among the unemployed, µ, and
raises the proportion of high productivity workers among the employed, ν.
With no change in the productivities of high and low productivity workers
(i.e., there is no productivity shock), the average productivity φ goes up.
The decline in employment is then associated with an increase in average
productivity. These results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 In the Employment Criterion Model, a higher interest rate yields
a higher employment criterion, higher unemployment rates and lower employ-
ment. If the unemployment rates are suﬃciently small, a higher interest rate
yields a higher proportion of high productivity workers among the employed,
ν, and higher average productivity.
The possibility of opposite relationships between employment and average
productivity, depending on the source of the disturbance, explains weak or
contradictory evidence of the cyclicality of productivity. The possibility of
opposite relationships is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 In the Employment Criterion Model (with the wage rate ﬁxed),
an increase in employment can occur with an increase or a decrease in av-
erage productivity depending on whether the source of the disturbance is a
productivity shock or a ﬂuctuation in the interest rate.
Figure 6 shows the two diﬀerent relations between average productivity
and the aggregate employment rate, given by ρ(1−u1)+(1−ρ)(1−u2). Con-
sistent with Theorem 6, productivity shocks generate a negative and positive
relation between employment and average productivity, while interest rate
ﬂuctuations generate a negative relation.
Another disturbance often discussed in the macroeconomic literature is
a change in the real wage. With homogeneous labor, an exogenous increase
in the real wage reduces employment by moving ﬁrms back up their derived
demand curves. The lower employment levels result in higher average labor
productivity (since the capital to labor ratio is increased). In the model
developed here (with heterogeneous labor and an employment criterion), an
increase in the wage has the same eﬀects as an increase in the interest rate.
The employment criterion must be higher to satisfy 12, employment de-
creases, and the average productivity increases. The consequences of a wage









Figure 6: Alternative Relations Between Employment and Average Produc-
tivity
i n c r e a s ea r et h e r e f o r et h es a m ea si nt h es t a n d a r dm a c r o e c o n o m i ca n a l y s i s ,
even though the productivity of a given worker does not decline as more
workers are hired. Wage rate ﬂuctuations (holding the productivity shock
and interest rate ﬁxed) generate the same relationship between employment
and average productivity as interest rate ﬂuctuations.
In the analysis of Sections 2 and 3, the wage has been taken to be ex-
ogenously determined. If productivity shocks have only short term eﬀects,
they can be expected to have negligible eﬀects on the wage rate and this
assumption is reasonable. If on the other hand a productivity shock has a
lasting eﬀect, then eventually the wage would adjust. Wage adjustment to a
continuing productivity shock can be determined from the aggregate condi-
tion that in the long run, the wage must be such that ﬁrm proﬁts are zero.
Using this approach, the ﬁrm proﬁt expression in 8 can be set equal to zero
and solved for the wage w as a function of the employment condition, y0. The
wage rate generated by the resulting function is such that ﬁrm proﬁts are
zero. This relation can then be combined with the relation generated by the
market condition 12 to yield the long run determination of the wage. This is
demonstrated in Figure 7. The downward sloping curve shows combinations
of w and y0 that yield zero ﬁrm proﬁts. From 8, the ﬁrm faces a cost for










Figure 7: Determination of Wage Rate
every worker interviewed, CI. If the ﬁrm hires fewer workers (because of a
higher employment criterion), then the proﬁto ne a c hh i r e dw o r k e rm u s tb e
greater. This in turn requires that the wage be lower, generating the down-
ward sloping zero proﬁt curve in Figure 7. The upward sloping curve in the
ﬁgure arises from the market condition 12. At higher wage rates, the proﬁts
from the high and low productivity workers are lower, leading ﬁrms to choose
a higher employment criterion. The intersection of the two curves yields the
wage rate and employment criterion consistent with long run equilibrium.
5 Conclusions
The phenomenon that drives the conclusions of this paper is that the mix
of workers changes in response to productivity shocks. In response to a
positive productivity shock, the proportion of employed workers that are low
productivity increases. This change in the mix of workers has an eﬀect on
the average productivity that is opposite to the productivity shock itself.
As a result, there can be a substantial and positive employment response to
a positive productivity shock without a large observed increase in average
productivity.
The change in the mix of workers arises because ﬁrms in the paradigmatic
18model face a problem of choosing an employment criterion rather than an
amount of labor to hire at a given wage rate. With the employment criterion
as the variable subject to ﬁrm control, labor market reactions to productivity
shocks take the form of adjustments in the employment criterion rather than
direct changes in employment and, indirectly, in wage rates. The ﬂuctuations
in the employment criterion yield the changes in mix of workers and employ-
ment. Wage changes take place through a process that may take longer than
the adjustments in ﬁrm employment criteria.
The weak relationship between employment and observed average pro-
ductivity is demonstrated in the case worked out in the paper, in which the
positive productivity shock results in a decline in the employment criterion
(instead of just an increase that is smaller than the productivity shock, the
outcome proven in Theorem 4). Then employment increases both because of
the positive productivity shock and because of the reduction in the criterion.
Opposite relations between employment and observed average productiv-
ity can also arise because of diﬀerent sources of disturbances in the model.
Productivity shocks can yield a positive but weak relationship between em-
ployment and observed average productivity, while disturbances that gen-
erate a ﬂuctuation in the interest rate could yield a negative relationship.
Estimates of correlations would then be sensitive to time periods included.
The employment criterion model developed here provides a simple means
to explain observed relationships among major macroeconomic variables, in-
cluding employment, wage rates and productivity, that are inconsistent with
a simple homogeneous worker view of the labor market. When ﬁrms use em-
ployment criteria as the margin of adjustment during business cycles, produc-
tivity shocks can generate large ﬂuctuations in employment with no strong
correlation between observed productivity and employment.
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